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Abstract
Recently, neural network based dialogue sys-
tems have become ubiquitous in our increas-
ingly digitalized society. However, due to their
inherent opaqueness, some recently raised con-
cerns about using neural models are starting to
be taken seriously. In fact, intentional or un-
intentional behaviors could lead to a dialogue
system to generate inappropriate responses.
Thus, in this paper, we investigate whether
we can learn to craft input sentences that re-
sult in a black-box neural dialogue model be-
ing manipulated into having its outputs con-
tain target words or match target sentences.
We propose a reinforcement learning based
model that can generate such desired inputs
automatically. Extensive experiments on a
popular well-trained state-of-the-art neural di-
alogue model show that our method can suc-
cessfully seek out desired inputs that lead to
the target outputs in a considerable portion of
cases. Consequently, our work reveals the po-
tential of neural dialogue models to be manip-
ulated, which inspires and opens the door to-
wards developing strategies to defend them.
1 Introduction
In recent years, we have seen an astonishingly
fast adoption of dialogue systems being utilized
across many domains and we are interacting with
them more and more in our everyday lives. From
early such as chatbots ELIZA (Weizenbaum, 1966)
and ALICE (Wallace, 2001) to later ones like Siri
and XiaoIce (Shum et al., 2018), the techniques
have evolved from hand-crafted rule-based meth-
ods (Weizenbaum, 1966; Goddeau et al., 1996),
retrieval-based methods (Lu and Li, 2013; Hu et al.,
2014) to learning-based methods (Shang et al.,
2015; Vinyals and Le, 2015; Serban et al., 2016).
Recently, because of the advent of a series of deep
learning models and the appearance of large-scale
real dialogue corpora, end-to-end neural generative
dialogue models emerge (Chen et al., 2017). Due
to the simple implementation and the strong gen-
eralization ability of neural dialogue models, they
are one of the most popular techniques to build
practical chatbot services (Zhou et al., 2018).
However, with the wide application of neural
dialogue models, the ethical challenges they bring
are attracting more and more attention (Hender-
son et al., 2017; Liu et al., 2019a; Dinan et al.,
2019). More recently it has been demonstrated that
neural networks suffer from some problems includ-
ing vulnerability due to their black-box nature and
our lack of truly understanding their inner process-
ing (Szegedy et al., 2013; Xu et al., 2019). Thus,
as we are integrating these systems into more crit-
ical and sensitive domains, it raises some serious
concerns (Yuan et al., 2019), such as whether or
not they can be manipulated to provide certain de-
sired output (He and Glass, 2018; Liu et al., 2019b).
More specifically, if such systems can be manipu-
lated it could potentially cause a drastic shift to the
current paradigm of how we interact with these sys-
tems. For example, Tay, an AI chatbot developed
by Microsoft, was shut down shortly after release
due to its racism, sexist and obscene speech (Wolf
et al., 2017). Online troublemakers found its vul-
nerability and tried a variety of inputs to induce
it to output inappropriate (malicious or sensitive)
responses (Price, 2016). To that end, in this work,
we set out to study this fundamental question of
whether we can learn to manipulate state-of-the-
art black-box dialogue models to produce target
outputs by crafting inputs automatically. It goes
without saying that if indeed we can manipulate
these systems and if we are currently integrating
them into our daily lives at such a rapid pace, then
this opens the door to a plethora of potential harm-
ful attacks that could be performed and potentially
result in an almost unimaginable set of possible
negative outcomes.
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Nevertheless, even having now realized how crit-
ical this question is to being answered, the path to
discovering an answer has numerous challenges.
First, unlike many existing studies in other do-
mains such as images (Goodfellow et al., 2014;
Chen, 2018), here the input search space is dis-
crete and thus the traditional gradient-based opti-
mization methodologies cannot be harnessed effec-
tively (Zhang et al., 2019; Zhao et al., 2017). Fur-
thermore, while seeking to discover if the current
dialogue systems can be manipulated, we should
not make the unreasonable assumption of having
access to the full details/knowledge (i.e., model
structure and parameters) of the system. Currently,
most developed methodologies have focused on
the continuous input space domain and further-
more assumed access to the model. Thus, since
our problem is defined with a discrete input do-
main and our concern of whether these models can
be manipulated is more realistic in the setting of a
black-box dialogue model, then existing methods
can not be applied and we require the development
of novel frameworks to answer this indispensable
fundamental question.
To address the above-mentioned challenges, in
this paper, we regard the learning to craft input
sentences as a sequential decision-making process.
To this end, we propose the Target Dialogue Gener-
ation Policy Network (TDGPN), which serves as
a reinforcement learning (RL) agent to iteratively
generate tokens guided towards specific objectives.
The proposed policy networks are optimized by the
REINFORCE-style estimators (Williams, 1992),
eliminating the needs for standard gradient back-
propagation which is largely impaired by the dis-
crete nature of the sentence generation process and
the assumption of no access to the dialogue model
parameters. Our main contributions are summa-
rized as follows:
• We identify the importance of exploring the
potential of a black-box neural dialogue model
to be manipulated towards a target output.
• We devise an RL-based framework TDGPN to
effectively overcome the challenges associated
with crafting inputs that enable black-box neural
dialogue models to generate target responses.
• Experiments on a well-trained black-box neu-
ral dialogue model verify the effectiveness of
TDGPN that lead to target responses with a con-
siderable success rate.
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Figure 1: Diagram showing the overall reinforcement
learning process for TDGPN.
2 The Proposed Framework
2.1 Problem Definition
Before detailing the proposed framework, we first
recap the problem of learning to manipulate neu-
ral dialogue models. Suppose we have a neural
dialogue model D, which is regarded as a black
box and able to output a response sentence SD
for a given input sentence. We seek for learning
to craft an input sentence S that will lead D to
output a response SD := D(S) that satisfies spe-
cific requirements. We consider the following two
manipulation tasks:
Target word task. Given a target word wT ,
we aim to learn to craft an input sentence S that
will lead the dialogue model to output a response
sentence SD that contains the target word, i.e.,
wT ∈ SD.
Target response task. Given a target response
ST , we aim to learn to craft an input sentence S that
will lead the dialogue model to output a response
sentence SD that is semantically approximate to
the target response, i.e., SD ≈ ST .
We build a generative model Gθ parameterized
by θ to learn to craft such input sentences. Then
the above problems are both essentially an opti-
mization problem where we want to find optimum
parameters of G so that a) the probability of wT
being generated in SD, or b) the similarity between
D(S) and ST can be maximized. However, it is
very challenging to solve this problem with the
standard gradient-based back-propagation methods
because of two reasons. First, S consists of dis-
crete tokens instead of continuous values. Thus, it
is difficult to let the gradient back through G. Sec-
ond, we do not have access to the dialogue model
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Figure 2: Diagram showing how to obtain the inter-
mediate reward R(S1:t, at) at step st using the Monte
Carlo (MC) method.
parameters, which makes it impossible to compute
the gradient w.r.t D. Therefore, in this section, we
formulate the problem as an RL problem and repre-
sent the generative model Gθ by a policy network
piθ, which regards the token generation process as a
decision making process with the purpose to obtain
a maximum reward.
The overall learning diagram is shown in Fig-
ure 1. There are two key components, i.e., pol-
icy network and environment which consists of a
dialogue model and a reward function. The pol-
icy network will interact with the environment by
generating input sentences S. Then, based on S
the environment will provide rewards to the policy
network, which will in turn update its parameters
towards obtaining maximum rewards. Next, we
detail the interaction process.
2.2 Sentence Generation Process
In this subsection, we describe the sentence gener-
ation process which can be regarded as a decision
making process. On a high level, at each step, a
policy network observes the state, outputs a token
(i.e., makes an action) and receives a reward based
on the dialogue model (i.e. environment). The
generation process will be terminated when the pol-
icy network outputs an end-of-sentence token, after
which the policy network will be updated according
to the rewards. Next, we describe the state, actions,
policy network, reward, and objective function.
2.2.1 State and Action
In our framework, we denote the state at step t
of the sentence generation process as st and let
st = S1:t, where S1:t is a sequence of already
generated tokens at step t. More specifically,
S1:t = {x1, x2, · · · , xt}, where xi ∈ V and V
is the vocabulary containing all the possible tokens.
In addition, we assume that the state is fully ob-
served. The start state is s0 = {x0} which consists
of a special token x0 that indicates the start of a
sentence. Thus, the state transition is determinis-
tic such that P (st = S1:t|st−1, at = xt) = 1 and
P (st = s′|st−1, at = xt) = 0,∀s′ 6= S1:t, where
at is the action (i.e., token) at step t.
2.2.2 Policy Network
In this work, we represent the policy by a Long
Short-Term Memory (LSTM) Network whose in-
put is the state and output is selection probabilities
p over all the possible actions, which are the tokens
in V including a special token indicating the end
of the sentence and leading to the terminate state.
The weights of the LSTM are the policy parameters
denoted by θ. More specifically, given the current
state st = S1:t = {x1, x2, · · · , xt}, where xi ∈ V
is the token generated at step t, the LSTM will out-
put a sequence of hidden states {h1, h2, · · · , ht}
by the following recursive functions:
ht = LSTM(xt, ht−1) (1)
With the hidden states {h1, h2, · · · , ht}, the rep-
resentation of current state mt can be obtained
through:
mt = g(h1, h2, · · · , ht) (2)
where g(·) is a function that maps the hidden states
to a d-dimensional hidden space and there are many
choices for g(·) such as using a popular attention
mechanism (Bahdanau et al., 2014). In this work,
we let g(h1, h2, · · · , ht) = ht, which is commonly
used for many RNN-based models and leave the
investigation into other choices as a future work.
With the representation mt, the probability distri-
bution over all the possible actions piθ(a|mt) is
calculated as:
piθ(a|mt) = softmax(Wvmt + bv) (3)
where Wv ∈ R|V|×d and bv are the parameters to
be learned during the training process when having
a vocabulary size of |V|.
2.2.3 Reward
Remember that ST is the target sentence and let
SD = D(S) be the response produced by the dia-
logue model D when given S as input. We define
two different reward functions for the two manipu-
lation tasks.
Target word task. In this task we want to
learn an input sentence which leads to the dialogue
model to output a response containing the target
word wT . Thus, we wish that the probability of
the target word predicted by the output layer of the
dialogue model to be the largest at some timestamp
t ∈ [T ]. We define the reward of the input sentence
S as follows:
R(S) = max
t∈[T ]
(pt(w
T )− max
w 6=wT
{pt(wT )}) (4)
where pt(wT ) is the predicted probability of target
word wT at timestamp t and maxw 6=wT {pt(wT )}
indicates the largest probability among all the
words other than wT at this timestamp.
Target response task. In this task, we wish
the dialogue model can output a response that is
semantically similar to the target response but not
necessarily exactly matching it. We use the average
word embedding similarity (Wieting et al., 2016)
between ST and SD = D(S) as the reward for
the input sentence generated by the policy network.
We define the reward as follows:
R(S) = Sim(ST , D(S)) (5)
where S is the sentence generated by the policy
network and Sim is the similarity measurement.
Eq (4) and (5) only provide the final rewards to
the whole generated sentence S. In addition, we
design the reward R(S1:t, at) at the intermediate
state st to be the action-value function. Formally,
R(S1:t, at) = Q
piθ(S1:t, at) (6)
where Qpiθ(a, St) is the Q-value, which estimates
the expected final reward for the given action and
state pair (Watkins and Dayan, 1992). We further
adopt the Monte Carlo methods (Yu et al., 2017;
Sutton et al., 2000) to estimate Qpiθ(S1:t, at). The
way to calculate the intermediate reward is shown
in Figure 2. Specifically, given S1:t and at, we use
current policy piθ to continuously simulate T − t
tokens until the terminate state is reached, where
T is the length of the complete simulated sentence.
The simulation process will be repeated N r times.
We define this formally as follows:{
Sj1:T
}Nr
j=1
= Simulationpiθ(S1:t, at) (7)
where Sj1:T is a simulated sentence and S
j
1:t = S1:t
for all j ∈ {1, . . . , N r}. Now, given
{
Sj1:T
}Nr
j=1
,
the estimation of R(S1:t, at) is calculated as:
R(S1:t, at) =
1
N r
Nr∑
j=1
Sim(ST , D(Sj1:T )) (8)
where t < T indicates the intermediate step. We
note that when t = T we can directly use Eq (4)
and (5) rather than Eq. (8).
Objective Function. With the previously defined
reward function, the objective function that the
agent aims to maximize can be formulated as fol-
lows:
J(θ) = ES∼piθ(S)R(S) (9)
The accurate value of J(θ) in Eq. (9) is very dif-
ficult to obtain in practice. Next, we describe our
optimization procedure for TDGPN.
2.3 Monte-Carlo Policy Gradient:
REINFORCE
To optimize the objective in Eq. (9), we adopt the
widely used REINFORCE algorithm (Williams,
1992), where Monte-Carlo sampling is applied to
estimate∇θJ(θ). Specifically,
∇θJ(θ) =
∑
S
R(S)∇piθ(S) (10)
= ES∼piθ(S)[R(S)piθ(S)∇ log piθ(S)]
≈ 1
N
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
∇θ log piθ(ait|Si1:t)R(S)
We replace the reward for the whole sentence in
Eq. (10) with the intermediate reward to acceler-
ate the training speed and effectiveness (Liu et al.,
2017). Thus, the estimated gradient of TDGPN’s
objective is rewritten as:
∇θJ(θ) ≈ 1
N
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
∇θ log piθ(ait|Si1:t)R(Si1:t, ait)
(11)
With the obtained gradient∇θJ(θ), the parameters
of the policy network piθ can be updated as follows:
θ = θ + α∇θJ(θ) (12)
where α is the learning rate.
2.4 Alternate Learning
At the beginning of the RL training, since the pol-
icy network has little knowledge about the environ-
ment, it just randomly generates input sentences
which hardly lead the dialogue model to output
an expected response. As a result, few action-
state pairs (S1:t,at) can receive positive rewards
R(S1:t,at). This problem impacts training effi-
ciency seriously. To solve this issue, we propose
to use samples that we know are closer to the de-
sired input sentences so far as extra guidance to
train the policy network. We call them “pacesetter”
samples. Recall that in each iteration, we sample
N input sentences for RL training. The lengths of
these sample sentences are {ti}Ni=1. To estimate
the reward for each state-action pair, we simulate
N r complete input sentences. So we can get totally∑N
i=1N
rti complete input sentences and their cor-
responding rewards. We collect the input sentences
with the largest top-K rewards as the pacesetter
samples. Then, we use the pacesetter samples as
the training examples to optimize the policy net-
work via supervised learning (SL) for once. We
update the parameters in the policy network by opti-
mizing the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE)
objective of the pacesetter samples. In this way,
we perform RL and SL alternately to speed up the
convergence of the policy network.
The detailed optimization process is shown in
Algorithm 1. Here we briefly introduce the algo-
rithm. In line 1, we initialize the policy network
piθ using a pre-trained language model piθ0 . From
line 3 to line 10, we use our proposed algorithm
to update the parameters of piθ, until it could gen-
erate sentences that will make the dialogue model
output the target sentence ST or the number of
iterations exceed M . Specifically, in line 5, we
randomly sample N sentences from piθ, then for
each sampled sentence at each step t, we sample
N r sentences to estimate the intermediate reward
(i.e., action-value)R(Si1:t, a
i
t) and compute the gra-
dient according to Eq. (11), which is used to update
θ by Eq. (12). In lines 14 and 15, we collect the
pacesetter samples and update the policy network
on them via supervised learning. If the policy net-
work cannot find a desired sentence S∗ within M
iterations, the algorithm will output a “Failure”.
Algorithm 1: Optimization for TDGPN
Input: Dialogue model D, a pre-trained language model
piθ0 , target word w
T or target response ST ,
hyper-parameters including N , M , Nr , K and α
Output: an desired sentence S∗ or “Failure”
1 Initialize piθ: piθ ← piθ0 ;
2 iter← 1;
3 repeat
4 iter← iter + 1;
5 Generate N sentences
{
Si
}N
i=1
from piθ
6 for i← 1 to N do
7 for t← 1 to T do
8 Sample
{
Sijt
}Nr
j=1
based on Si1:t and piθ
9 Compute R(Si1:t, ait) according to Eq. (8)
10 ∇θJ(θ)←
∇θJ(θ)+∇θlogpiθ(ait, Si1:t)R(Si1:t, ait)
11 end
12 end
13 θ ← θ + α
N
∇θJ(θ);
14 Collect the top-K pacesetter samples {pi}Ki=1 from
{Sijt |i ∈ [1, N ], j ∈ [1, Nr], t ∈ [1, ti]};
15 Update piθ on {pi}Ki=1;
16 until iter >=M or find a sentence S∗ such that D(S∗)
satisfies the requirement.
3 Experiment
3.1 Experimental Settings
In this subsection, we give a description of the
experimental settings including the state-of-the-art
dialogue model we are trying to manipulate, the
implementation details of the policy network, and
the training procedure of the proposed framework.
The Dialogue Model. The experiments are
conducted on a classic Seq2Seq (Sutskever et al.,
2014) neural dialogue model. In this Seq2Seq
model, both the encoder and the decoder are im-
plemented by 3-layer LSTM networks with hidden
states of size 1024. The vocabulary size is 30,000.
Pre-trained Glove word vectors (Pennington et al.,
2014) are used as the word embeddings whose di-
mension is 300.
Dataset. A Twitter Conversation Corpus is used
to pre-train the policy network, construct target
response list, etc. This corpus is different from
the one for training the black-box dialogue model.
The corpus consists of tweets and replies extracted
from Twitter. It contains 1,394,939 single-turn En-
glish dialogues in open domains. The dataset is
randomly split into training set, validation set, and
test set, which consist of 976,457, 139,498 and
278,984 dialogues, respectively.
Implementation Details. In this work, we use
a 2-layer LSTM with the hidden size being 1,024
as the policy network, which is implemented with
Pytorch (Paszke et al., 2019). Before the manipula-
tion experiments, we pre-trained the LSTM on the
training set of the Twitter dialogue corpus where
every single post or reply is treated as a sentence,
resulting in around 1.9 million sentences in total.
Specifically, in the pre-training process, the model
is optimized by the standard stochastic gradient
descent algorithm with the learning rate of 1.0. In
addition, to prevent overfitting issues, we apply the
dropout with the rate of 0.1 and gradient clipping
with clip-value being 0.25. Moreover, the word em-
beddings are randomly initialized and fine-tuned
during the pre-training process.
As for the details in relation to Algorithm 1, we
set the sample size N to be 5. The number of sim-
ulations per generated sentence (i.e., N r) is set to
5. The maximum sequence length is 5 and 10 for
target word task and target response task, respec-
tively. In addition, the policy network parameters
are optimized by Adam (Kingma and Ba, 2014)
with the learning rate of 0.001 and 0.05 for the
above two tasks, respectively. During RL training,
once we find a sample that satisfies a requirement,
the training process will stop and we consider it
to be successful. On the other hand, if the model
cannot find a desired sample within M = 50 it-
erations, then we consider it as a failure. For the
target word task, the requirement is that the out-
put response contains the target word; while for the
target response task, the requirement is that the sim-
ilarity between the output response and the target
response exceeds a threshold.
We note in the target word task, we don’t directly
adopt the reward defined in Eq. (4). Instead, for
an input sentence S, we use max(R(S) − b, 0),
where b is a baseline defined as the average reward
value of a batch of input sentences. By the function
max(·, 0), we replace all the negative rewards with
0 and only keep the positive rewards. Additionally,
for the target response task, before RL training,
we build a reference corpus by feeding 200k utter-
ances (from the training set of the Twitter dialogue
corpus) into the dialogue model and obtain 200k
input-response pairs. Then, in order to improve the
efficiency of training, at the beginning of each train-
ing session, we search 5 inputs whose responses
are most similar to the target response as the first
batch to train the model.
Table 1: Results of the target word task.
Success Rate Average Iterations
Common 65% 12.64
Malicious 30% 38.73
Table 2: Case Study of the target word task on Mali-
cious target word list. Input indicates the input crafted
by TDGPN and output is the corresponding response
produced by the dialogue model. Num.Iter represents
the number of iterations.
Target word: shit
Input: then start to eat
Output: i ’ m not going to eat that shit
Num.Iter: 5
Target word: ass
Input: fat , i’m too classy
Output: i ’ m not a fat ass
Num.Iter: 7
Target word: idiot
Input: when he is boring that
Output: he ’ s a fucking idiot
Num.Iter: 24
3.2 Experimental Results
In this subsection, we present the results of our
experiments.
Target word task. In the experiments, we con-
struct two lists of words as our target words. We
randomly sample 200 words from the most frequent
800 words of the Twitter conversation corpus. They
form the Common target word list. Moreover, we
manually construct a Malicious target word list
containing 50 malicious or dirty words that a dia-
logue agent has to avoid to say 1.
Table 1 shows the success rate of our proposed
TDGPN as well as the average number of iterations
the algorithm performs to achieve a successful ma-
nipulation. We can see that our algorithm can ma-
nipulate the dialogue model successfully for a con-
siderable number of target words. Moreover, we
observe that the common words achieve higher suc-
cess rate and need fewer iterations, which means
that it’s easier to manipulate the common words
than the malicious words. We show three cases of
successful manipulation on malicious target words
in Table 2.
Target response task. For the target response
task, we first construct two lists of target responses.
So called Generated and Real target response lists
are used. To construct the generated target response
list, we first feed 200k human utterances from the
1When doing experiments on the malicious target words,
we set N = 10 and M = 100.
test set of the Twitter dialogue corpus into the dia-
logue model to get 200k generated responses and
then randomly sample 200 responses as the targets
in length 1-3, 4-6 and 7-10, respectively. The real
target response list is obtained by randomly sam-
pling sentences from the rest part of the test set
of the Twitter dialogue corpus. And we filter out
some sentences which also occur in the generated
target response list, to ensure that there is no over-
lap between two lists. The number of real target
responses in each length group is also 200.
In Figure 3, we show the success rates of
TDGPN for manipulating the Twitter dialogue
model on two lists of target responses. The fig-
ure shows how success rates vary with different
thresholds. For example, in Figure (a), we can suc-
cessfully find desired inputs that lead to responses
whose similarities with the target ones are above
the threshold 0.8, for 34.5% generated target re-
sponses with length 1-3.
First of all, from the figures we can see that for
both the generated and the real target lists, TDGPN
can achieve a success rate 85% − 100% with a
threshold of 0.5. Especially for more than around
80% generated targets with length greater than or
equal to 4, TDGPN is able to find desired inputs
that lead to a similarity score above 0.8. One key
observation is that the model performs significantly
better on the generated target list than on the real
target response list. Actually, the neural dialogue
models suffer from a safe response problem (Li
et al., 2015). Such models tend to offer generic re-
sponses to diverse inputs, which makes it hard for
the model to provide a target specific response (of-
ten seen in real human conversations). In addition,
we observe that the success rate of manipulation
is closely related to the length of target responses.
Except for a few cases, for longer target responses,
it’s easier for TDGPN to manipulate the dialogue
model to say something similar to them.
The Quality of Crafted Inputs. For each real tar-
get response, TDGPN tries to find an input whose
corresponding output response is most similar to
the target one. We also feed the real inputs corre-
sponding to the target responses in the corpus into
the dialogue model. We aim to check how similar
the output responses to the target ones in manipu-
lated and original settings. To further demonstrate
the effectiveness of the proposed framework in ma-
nipulating the dialogue model, we calculate these
similarity scores for each real target response and
Table 3: Average similarity scores between the output
response and the target response in Real list.
Length 1-3 4-6 7-10
Real Input 0.439 0.518 0.566
TDGPN 0.69 0.726 0.748
report the average value in Table 3. From the table,
we make the following observations. First, even
inputting the real inputs, the similarity scores be-
tween the output responses and the target responses
are not high. Second, with the generated inputs
from the proposed framework, the similarity scores
are significantly improved. Specifically, the word
embedding similarity increases by 57.2%, 40.2%
and 32.2% for the target responses with length 1-3,
4-6 and 7-10, respectively.
Case Study. Table 4 shows five examples in the
manipulating experiments. The first three target
responses are from the generated target response
list while the other two are from the real response
list. Given those target responses, desired inputs
are successfully crafted. Each of them leads to
an output of the dialogue model similar to the tar-
get one, evaluating by the corresponding similarity
measurement. Besides, unlike some related works
(He and Glass, 2018; Cheng et al., 2018) where
crafted text inputs are ungrammatical and meaning-
less, the inputs generated by our model are smooth
and natural utterances, which is guaranteed by the
language model.
4 Related Work
Model attack in NLP has been a fast-moving field
especially across many neural based methodolo-
gies (Chakraborty et al., 2018; Xu et al., 2019),
since our understanding of their inner workings is
quite limited. Chen et al. (Chen, 2018) investigate
the ability for small perturbations that could result
in the image captioning to contain a randomly se-
lected keyword/caption. Although this is similar to
our problem in that they are generating target text,
the key difference is that they are working with
continuous inputs (i.e., images). Similarly, some
work has focused on text classification (Kuleshov
et al., 2018; Liang et al., 2018), but in the white-box
setting as compared to our framework is proposed
in the black-box setting.
Our work is primarily related to other works
focused on building a better understanding of
Table 4: Case Study. The first column shows the inputs from TDGPN. The middle column shows the target
responses and the outputs by the dialogue model. The third column shows the similarity score.
Inputs Responses Similarity
the band perry is goin to be at the
movies
Target: i ’ m going to be there tomorrow ! 0.958
Output: i ’ m going to be there
i followed you so you better follow
me back
Target: i ’ m not following you . 0.952
Output: i ’ m sorry i ’ m not following you
so i have a friend in the sea
Target: i ’ m in the same boat lol 0.958
Output: i ’ m in the same boat .
what’s poppin peeps ?
Target: nothing much just us chatting shit really 0.826
Output: nothing much , just chillin
honestly i miss my brother
Target: me = miss you ( : lol . 0.876
Output: i miss you too
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Figure 3: Results for the target response task.
sequence-to-sequence based dialog system models,
such as their over-sensitivity and over-stability (Niu
and Bansal, 2018), robustness (Cheng et al.,
2018) and likeliness of generating egregious re-
sponses (He and Glass, 2018). In (Cheng
et al., 2018) the problem of attacking sequence-
to-sequence models is presented to evaluate the
robustness of this class of deep neural networks.
Unlike our work, they focus on the development of
a white-box framework that is built around having
the gradient. However, in practice, the assump-
tion of accessing the full knowledge of the neural
network is far less practical (Zhang et al., 2019).
Then Niu et al. (Niu and Bansal, 2018) focus on
using adversarial training to investigate both over-
sensitivity and over-stability of dialogue models,
where the small changes to the input should or
should not change the output of the dialogue sys-
tem, respectively. Besides, He et al. (He and Glass,
2018) focus on learning an input to generate a spe-
cific offensive/malicious output of a pre-trained
dialogue system. However, our proposed frame-
work is based on the black-box setting (unlike their
model, which is under the white-box assumption)
which raises significantly higher levels of com-
plexity to develop an optimization process. The
work (Liu et al., 2019b) investigates the target re-
sponse task on the black-box setting. The authors
train a reusable reverse dialogue generator by rein-
forcement learning and use it to discover the inputs
leading to target outputs through multiple trials.
5 Conclusion
Currently, the state-of-the-art dialogue systems are
harnessing the power of deep neural models, and al-
though they are proving to become more and more
human-like, recent concerns have been raised for
neural models across all domains as to whether
they can be manipulated (with most focusing on
malicious attacks). Thus, in this work, we investi-
gate whether current neural dialogue models can
be manipulated and develop a reinforcement learn-
ing based sentence generation framework that can
learn to craft the input sentences causing dialogue
models to output target words and responses. We
conduct extensive experiments on a state-of-the-art
dialogue neural model and the results show that
dialogue systems can indeed be manipulated. In ad-
dition, our proposed method is not only able to ma-
nipulate neural dialogue model, but it’s also likely
to be applied on black-box dialogue systems based
on other methods (e.g. rule-based, retrieval-based,
etc.), or even models for other natural language
generation tasks (e.g. text summarization, machine
translation, etc.). We will leave the investigations
on these areas as future works.
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